Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. 
commitment prevent long term contracts and reduce the possibility of outside …nancing. It follows that …rms need to …nance a large portion of the cost of the technology internally, which means that they may not be able to invest an optimal level in prevention. Insurance companies with large cash holdings, on the other hand, can provide …nancing to their clients. According to Caillaud, Dionne and Jullien (2000) , optimal …nancial contracts for …rms with …nancial needs and exposure to value-reducing accident risk is a combination of a debt and an insurance contract. Financing and insurance do not have to be provided by separate entities. Insurers have an informational advantage to o¤er …nancing since they know the level of risk in the …rm, which other market participants can ignore.
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between a …rm and an insurer-provider of prevention, in a dynamic context. The …rm faces an insurable catastrophic risk in each of a …nite number of periods. It wants to invest in prevention, but, unfortunately, it does not have the technology to do so. Insurers on the other hand have the technology. The …rm has to hire an insurer to invest in prevention and obtain insurance against the bankruptcy risk. Prevention investments cannot be observed by outside insurers. Hence, an insurer does not know the risk type of the …rm unless he has worked with it in the previous period. A …rm that wants to change insurer must make its risk type known, which we model as entering in a round of costly auditing. For example, the …rm must hire an outside consultant who will assess the risk type of the …rm.
Corporations that seek to manage potential catastrophic losses and/or environmental hazards can either attempt to reduce the event's impact on cash ‡ows or reduce the likelihood that such an event will occur. This can be seen as an insurance problem where the insured …rms must choose an optimal level of precaution: Insurance reduces a catastrophic event's impact on cash ‡ows (severity) whereas investing in prevention technology reduces an event's frequency.
A catastrophic loss is de…ned in our model as a loss that will cause the …rm to go bankrupt. In the separation of duties, our paper is similar to that of Caillaud, Dionne and Jullien (2000) where it is shown that although …rms are risk neutral, …nancing requirements make it appear as if …rms are risk averse. The …rm needs insurance to cover bankruptcy risk. The insurer provides insurance and prevention technology.
The problem with investing in prevention technology is that its high speci…city and complexity makes it non veri…able by parties outside the industry. This triggers potential opportunistic behaviors from the part of either the insurer managing the technology or the …rm hosting it. This means that a …rm cannot use debt contracts to invest in prevention since its risk type is unknown to …nanciers. On the other hand, the insurer may not want to …nance the investment since he has no guarantee that the …rm may not claim the investment has not been done and then contract with a competitor.
Moreover, the prevention technology is additive so that investment in prevention today reduces the likelihood of catastrophes not only today, but also in the future. Once the investment is in place, every other investor can bene…t from it in the future since risk is now reduced. When there is only one period, the problem is quite trivial: The insurance contract is e¤ective for the same exact time period as the prevention technology. This means that the insurer will invest in an optimal level of prevention on behalf of the …rm. When more periods are involved, the insurer is faced with the dilemma that investing in prevention reduces the risk of the …rm, but it reduces the risk of the …rm no matter who insures the …rm in the future. 2 Moreover, insurance contracts are typically short term in nature (renegotiated every year or so) whereas investment in prevention lasts a long time. The long-term investment bene…ts clash with short-term insurance contracts.
When investements are non-veri…able, but o¤er long-term bene…ts, insurers face a hold up problem: What prevents the …rm from changing insurer? As is known from the literature on transaction-cost economy (see Williamson, 1979 ) the solution to the hold-up problem would be to bind both parties in a long term contract. The non veri…ability of investment, however, generates imperfect commitment. Using a coal mining/electricity generation example Joskow (1987 Joskow ( , 1988 shows that the hold-up problem may not be solved using long term contracts because commitment is imperfect and future uncertain. In this case, vertical integration can be the solution. We do not consider this possibility here since, even if the insurer's investment in the …rm is speci…c, the relationship between an insurer and the …rm is not. It may be pro…table for an insurance company to have departments specialized in several highly speci…c risk. However, transaction costs are such that it is not pro…table for the same insurance company to purchase all its clients since it would then have to change its activity completely.
With no binding contracts and no integration, we show that the hold-up situation results in suboptimal investment and delays in prevention investment under simple assumptions. We also show that in each period a …rm contracts with the same insurer who may use this informational advantage to charge a loading on the premium. Competition for this rent, however, drives an insurer's pro…t to zero in the initial period. 3 We present the basic model in the following section. In section 3 we present the contract under full commitment on the part of the …rm and the insurer. Section 4 focuses on the case where no long-term contracts can be signed. We introduce long term relationships with renegotiation in section 5 of the paper. It will then be clear that asymmetric information may not be the only problem reducing precaution in a dynamic context. In section 6, we discuss some assumptions underlying the resutls of our model to test its robustness. Section 7 concludes.
The basic model
Suppose N insurers 4 and 1 …rm living T + 1 periods denoted t = 0 ¢ ¢ ¢ T . In each period, the …rm receives a non random revenue W . Also, the …rm faces in each period a potential catastrophic loss L > W for which it wants to (or has to) insure. We can also view this L as including a penalty imposed by government for environmental damages due to the …rm's operations. The probability of such a catastrophic loss may be reduced through investment in some prevention technology. We denote x t the amount invested in prevention in period t and X t = P t ¿ =0 x ¿ the accumulated amount invested in prevention from period 0 through t. The amount invested in prevention is known to the …rm at all time.
A loss L occurs in period t with probability ¦ (X t ), whereas no loss occurs with probability (1 ¡ ¦ (X t )). More prevention is better, which means that the probability is decreasing in the amount of prevention: ¦ 0 (X t ) < 0. The probability function is convex, ¦ 00 (X t ) > 0, so that the marginal decrease in the probability of loss is reduced with each additional dollar invested in prevention. Finally, some prevention is always desirable as ¦ 0 (0) = ¡1. We also assume that 3 The standard literature on hold-up is static in the sense that the bargaining occurs only once. In our case, however, the insurance contract is resigned every period. We innovate on Rogerson, (1992) and Gul (2001) , by presenting a hold-up problem where insurers o¤er standard insurance contracts that generate zero pro…t in expectation. This contrasts with the …rm's impossibility to commit in the long run to the insurance relationship, which induces the insurer to invest only small amounts in each period. Other models on dynamic insurance have typically centered around the repetition of adverse selection (see Cooper and Hayes, 1987, and Doherty, 1994) and moral hazard (see Rogerson, 1985 , and Chiappori, Macho, Rey and Salanié, 1994) problems, whereas, in our case, the information problem is dealt with through veri…cation. When commitment is impossible, however, ratchet e¤ects arise that induce agents to delay the revelation of their true risk type (La¤ont and Tirole, 1987) . The key concern in our case is on the dynamics of prevention investments by consecutive insurers. More recently, the "Precautionary Principle" has shed light on problems of decision under dynamic uncertainty (see Briys and Schlesinger, 1990 , Gollier, Jullien and Treich, 2000 and Immordino, 2000 . 4 N does not have to be large to entail competition among insurers.
there is no depreciation in self-protection so that any amount invested in period t is still in use in the subsequent periods. 5 It is not possible to remove any part of the technology (i.e. investment is irreversible). We can view this prevention technology as an organizational design that is costly to implement, but that can run fully without alterations; this organizational design cannot be undone, however.
The …rm is faced with a potential loss L which could bankrupt it. Because of bankruptcy costs, we can view the …rm as being risk averse and thus in need of insurance. 6 De…ne V (W ) as the per period value of the …rm over …nal wealth, with V 0 (:) > 0 and V 00 (:) < 0. The intertemporal utility of the …rm is given by
where it is assumed that the …rm can go bankrupt in any period t with probability ¦(X t ), and where each period is discounted at some rate ± · 1.
Since the …rm has a concave utility function each period, it wishes not only to purchase insurance against the realization of an accident, but it also wishes to smooth its income across time. There are therefore Pareto improving trades possible between the …rm and a risk-neutral insurer, not only between states, but also across time. Purchasing insurance against the loss L eliminates the possibility of bankruptcy.
The accumulated amount invested in self-protection X t cannot be observed costlessly by outsiders. 7 Hence, potential insurers do not know the …rm's probability of accident unless a costly audit is performed. Auditing in period t costs a and reveals the …rm's exact level of risk, ¦ (X t ).
If an audit is conducted, the …rm's level of risk becomes public information.
At every period t, there is an insurance contract running between the …rm and an insurer. A contract can last one period or more, this paper examines the path of investment in prevention under di¤erent contractual timings. The contract speci…es a contingent transfer from the …rm to the insurer, p i t , i = n; l where l denotes the loss state and n the no-loss state. 8 The contract also 5 We show in part 6.2 that the introduction of a depreciation rate does not alter the result. 6 See Mayers and Smith (1982) , MacMinn (1987), Smith and Stulz (1985) and Caillaud, Dionne and Jullien (2000) for similar arguments. Another reason why …rms may be viewed as risk averse (and in need of insurance) is that the managers who run the …rm are undiversi…ed, and thus need protection from adverse shocks; see Stulz (1984) , Campbell and Kracaw (1987) and DeMarzo and Du¢e (1995) . 7 An outsider in period t is de…ned as any player (speci…cally any insurance company) that did not transact with the …rm in period t ¡ 1. 8 The investment in prevention, the insurance premium and the indemnity payment are embodied in p i t .
speci…es an amount of investment in prevention x t made prior to Nature's move. We denote d t the …nal wealth of the …rm in period t, d t representing the …rm's earnings W minus any transfer made to the insurer or as a payment for the audit.
We suppose that if an insurer remains with the …rm for more than one period, it gains proprietary knowledge of the …rm's level of risk. Since investment in self-protection is controlled by the insurers, the …rm's stock of prevention technology at the beginning of period t, X t¡1 , is known to the period t ¡ 1 insurer. In other words at the beginning of period t, the incumbent insurer knows the accumulated amount invested in prevention from period 0 till period t ¡ 1, which means that the incumbent insurer knows the risk type of the …rm at the beginning of period t, ¦ (X t¡1 ).
For the …rm to contract with another insurer at this time, it has to provide an audit report to inform the newcomer on the level of risk. For any outside insurer to learn a …rm's risk type an audit must be performed. The result of the audit is public information and is disseminated prior to the insurers making bids to insure the …rm's risk. Although an audit makes the prevention technology known to all insurers, only N ¡ 1 insurers bene…t from such an information dissemination, since the N th insurer (the incumbent) already knows this information prior to the audit being conducted.
Full commitment
When the …rm and the insurer can commit for the entire horizon, a long term optimal contract can be found in period 0 that prescribes transfers for all future contingencies. Such a contract stipulates a sequence of transfers fp n t ; p l t g T t=0 and investments fx t g T t=0 that maximizes the …rm's value over the T periods, under the constraint that the insurer's expected discounted payo¤ is at least equal to zero. Since the contract provides insurance against catastrophic losses, the …rm no longer faces states of the world in which it goes bankrupt. The problem then is:
Note that the …rm and the insurer have the same discount factor ±.
The set of constraints (1) prevents disinvestment in the technology, ensuring that the total amount invested is non-decreasing. This is a set of T irreversibility constraints. The last constraint, (2) , is the insurer's participation constraint. It ensures that the insurer receives at least an expected payo¤ of zero over its lifetime. Note that we subtract the cost of investment in prevention from the insurer's payo¤. The result is independent of the writing, however, considering that the insurer pays for the investment and charges it to the …rm through the transfers p t . By writing the problem this way, we allow the insurer to act as a …nancier for the …rm, paying for whatever investment is necessary and being reimbursed by the …rm through time.
Let us associate Lagrange multipliers¸t, t = 1 ¢ ¢ ¢ T to the irreversibility constraints and ¹ to the insurer's participation constraint. First order conditions for the problem are:
Solving this system of equations yields the optimal long-term contract. The optimal contract is described in what follows.
Proposition 1
The full commitment contract o¤ers full insurance and complete smoothing through a constant transfer p independent of the state, an amount X ¤¤ is invested in the initial period
and no investment is done in the subsequent periods.
Proof : See appendix.
Full insurance and complete smoothing is implied by the set of conditions (3). Marginal utilities are equalized through time and across states with a constant transfer p = p n t = p l t for all t. The amount X ¤¤ invested in period 0 equates the marginal cost of investment with its marginal pro…tability. Since investing today helps decrease the accident probability in each subsequent period, the marginal bene…t of precaution takes into account the decrease of the expected loss in each future period, discounted by factor ±. Hence, the longer the horizon (the higher T ), the greater the optimal investment X ¤¤ made in period 0.
After period 0, however, the irreversibility constraints are binding since the marginal bene…t of investment is shrinking with the number of periods left until the end of the horizon. The …rm and the insurer would like to sell back the technology when the weight of future pro…tability decreases.
Irreversibility constraints forbid that, which means that no investment occurs in periods 1 through T ; i.e., x t = 0 8 t = 1; :::; T .
The full-commitment long-term insurance contract is such that the insurer bears the cost of optimal investment X ¤¤ in period 0 and spreads out evenly the reimbursement by the …rm over the future periods, through an increase in the premium. The risk neutral insurer then o¤ers …nancing to the …rm and makes smoothing optimal when contracts are perfect.
No long-term contracts
Section 3 deals with the idealistic case where there are no contract imperfections, so that a long term contract always exist and does at least as well as a sequence of short term contracts. 9 In order to be able to …nd the dynamic insurance relationship when parties can renegotiate, we …rst study the extreme opposite of a full commitment long term contract. Hence, we determine in this section the equilibrium sequence of competitive contracts when the …rm cannot remain in relation with the same insurer more than one period.
If the players do not have access to long term contracts, they may rely on a sequence of competitive short-term insurance contracts. When an audit is conducted every period every insurer becomes informed about the …rm's risk. We suppose for now that there are no attempts from the insurers to try and keep the contract for longer than one period.
The short-sighted …rm
First, let us concentrate on the level of precaution achieved by a myopic …rm that does not consider the future bene…ts of precaution. 10 The …rm buys insurance and precautionary investment to maximize the per period …rm's value subject to the insurer's participation constraint for the period.
In each period t, the contract solves:
The …rst order conditions for that problem entail full insurance in each period t through uncondi-
It also entails the one-period optimal level of care X ¤ such that 1 + ¦ 0 (X ¤ )L = 0. Since the prevention technology does not depreciate, there is no investment after the …rst period: X t = X t¡1 for t¸1. Since there is no investment after period 0, the periodic contracts are identical in each period t > 0 and transfers p ¤ t are equal to the fair insurance premium:
However, the amount X ¤ is invested in period 0 and p ¤ 0 = p ¤ + X ¤ . This has many implications. First, the …rm must be able to pay for the investment level X ¤ in the …rst period: W ¡ a ¡ X ¤ ¡ p ¤¸0 . Second, even if the …rm can pay for it, the concavity of V implies that the …rm would like to spread the cost of investment on many periods. Moreover, the …rm should be aware that period 0 investment in prevention brings bene…ts for more than one period and should then want to invest an amount greater than X ¤ . The rational …rm should then choose investment in care and insurance so as to maximize a lifetime utility. We describe this problem in the next subsection.
The long-sighted …rm
A rational …rm considers its entire lifetime when solving for periodic insurance contracts and prevention. The problem is then the following:
The …rm chooses the sequence of contracts that maximizes its intertemporal utility over its lifetime.
Since an audit is conducted every period, the …rm is able to contract with any insurer every period, which means that a periodic participation constraint must be included for insurers every period.
Hence, we have T + 1 participation constraints imposing that the insurer's per period expected payo¤ is at least zero.
Applying multipliers¸t, t = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ T to the T irreversibility constraints and ¹ t , t = 0; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; T to the insurer's T + 1 participation constraints we …nd the following system of …rst order conditions:
Condition (6) implies that the …rm chooses full insurance in each period. Smoothing is not perfect, however, since the marginal utility of earnings evolves over time with ¹ t . Solving for this system of equations allows us to state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When the …rm must audit and sign a short term competitive insurance contract in each period, the path of investments and transfers are such that there is a datet 2 f1; :::; T g such that -for t <t, a positive investment x t is made in each period (multipliers¸t are zero), the ratio of marginal utilities is increasing through time and always less than 1. Transfers in these periods are p t = x t + ¦(X t )L so that the …rm's earnings are given by
-In periodt, there is no investment since condition 1 +
-For t¸t, the ratio of marginal utilities is 1 and the irreversibility constraints are binding (¸t > 0), so that no investment occurs. The …rm's earnings are then given by
The …rm has two opposite needs. First, it must invest as soon as possible in order to decrease the expected loss and, hence, the insurance premium to be paid in each period. The need to smooth income delays the investment, however. The size of the delay depends on the …xed income W , the cost of auditing a and the one-period optimal investment X ¤ . Hence, the irreversibility multiplieŗ is zero for the …rstt periods and the irreversibility constraint becomes binding when the number of future periods is not high enough to make a further investment valuable.
To prove this proposition, we need to present seven claims that are obtained from the …rst order conditions. Together they lead to the characterization of the sequence of transfers and investments obtained through a sequence of competitive contracts.
Claim 1 In each period t, the transfer is p t = X t ¡ X t¡1 + ¦(X t )L whatever the state of nature.
That means, the …rm chooses full insurance in each period but may not achieve perfect smoothing.
Proof : The proof of all seven claims are relegated to the appendix.
The optimal contract gives full insurance to the …rm since condition (6) implies p n t = p l t = p t for all t. Let us denote d t the …rm's income in period t in the contract, d t = W ¡ a ¡ p t . Since there is perfect competition on the insurance market, the transfer p t is equal to the fair price of insurance plus the cost of investment:
Hence, condition (6) now writes:
Claim 2 Investment in period 0 is never smaller than the one period optimal investment, that is,
Note that the level of precaution X ¤ maximizes the …rm's earnings in one period when the insurance premium is fair: X ¤ = arg max X fW ¡ X ¡ ¦(X)Lg. So, the …rm wants to invest at least that level in the …rst period. Since investment in period 0 brings bene…ts in period 1, there may be an incentive to invest beyond X ¤ in t = 0.
Claim 3 There is no investment in the last period. The …rm's income in period T is then
This, of course, results from our choice of a …nite horizon. Since the …rm no longer exists after period T , the optimal investment level is equal to the investment in the short sighted …rm:
This no-investment result depends on the fact that: 1-investment is positive in period 0 since ¦ 0 (0) = ¡1; and that 2-from Claim 2, the minimum investment realized in period 0 is X ¤ . Hence, in period T , at least X ¤ has already been invested in prevention so that there is no need for further prevention in this last period.
Claim 4
If there is investment in the …rst period only, the amount invested is less than the full commitment level X ¤¤ .
When full commitment in long term insurance contract is not possible, the insurer never invests as much as X ¤¤ in the …rst period. Thus, there is underinvestment if repeated competitive contracts are imposed to the …rm. This is due to the fact that with a sequence of short term, competitive contracts, the cost of investment cannot be …nanced by the …rst insurer who would spread the reimbursement of X 0 over the T ¡ 1 next periods. For period 1 through T , insurance must be priced at the expected loss on the competitive markets. Hence, the …rm has to pay for X 0 in the …rst period. Since it is concerned with the smoothing of its revenue, it would decrease the amount invested in t = 0. The next claim shows that underinvestment in the …rst period is indeed the consequence of investment delays.
Claim 5
If for some t < T , X t = X t¡1 , then X ¿ = X t¡1 for all ¿ > t Claim 5 means that if there is no investment performed in period t, then there will be none in the future. The proof of this claim teaches us a lot about the optimal pattern of investment.
In each period, the marginal cost of investing an additional dollar in protection is compared to the marginal bene…t of that investment (each of these amounts being, of course, weighted by the marginal utility in the period). Although the marginal cost of investment is equal to 1 in each period, the marginal bene…t decreases over time because the discounted sum of future expected losses decreases as time passes whereas precaution increases.
To see why, note that in a full commitment contract, investment is done in period zero such that the marginal bene…t of protection for the T periods to come is made equal to the marginal cost. The condition is then
When long term contracts are not allowed, investment is delayed because the …rm wants to smooth its revenue and distribute the burden of the investment over many periods. However, as time passes, the optimal amount of investment decreases since the number of future periods during which the …rm bene…ts is reduced. Hence, given there is no further investment after period t (and given perfect income smoothing after t), the optimal investment rule is
It follows that as soon as the above expression is nonnegative in one period, the existing amount of protection is su¢cient for the remaining periods, even if it may not have been for the period before. This indicates delay in investment. Since investment only occurs in the …rst few periods, it follows that if at some point in time investment is not pro…table, then it cannot be pro…table afterwards.
Claim 6
There is a periodt, 0 <t · T , in which no investment is made. The level of precaution reached before this period,X, is such that X ¤ <X < X ¤¤ .
The optimal path of investments depends on the periodic comparison between marginal cost and bene…ts of further investments as well as on the trade-o¤ between smoothing and protection.
Optimal decisions are given by the …rst order conditions (7) that can be written for all t (witḩ 0 = 0):
Claim 7 The smoothing obtained in the contract is represented by the ratio
is smaller than 1 as long as an investment is made, but increasing over time. After periodt,
Intuitively, since there is some investment in period 1, the irreversibility constraint does not bind (¸1 = 0 ). When there is no further investment (after periodt), competition between insurers imposes the same premium in each period. The …rms's earnings are then constant aftert, implying a ratio of marginal utilities equal to 1.
Claims 1 to 7 contribute to prove Proposition 2 and help visualize the path of investments. This section makes clear that there is a trade o¤ between early investment and smoothing. The …rm is better o¤ delaying investment on the …rst periods at the cost of facing a higher probability of loss in every period thereafter. As the number of periods remaining decreases, the marginal bene…t of investment decreases, until the marginal bene…t is zero. The level of technology at that time is lower than the level of technology invested in period 0 when long-term contracts were possible.
The non-binding long term contract
In section 4 we imposed that only one-period contracts are available and that the …rm had to incur the audit cost every period. Since audits are costly, conducting audits every period is obviously sub-optimal. The incumbent insurer should take advantage of the information he has at the end of period t ¡ 1 to propose a contract that would be cheaper than conducting a costly audit in period t.
It then follows that the transfer and investment schedule described in the previous section cannot be optimal if agents behave rationally.
We present in this section the optimal non-binding long term contract between a …rm and its insurer taking into account that parties can renegotiate. The …rm can still exit the relation in each period and contract with a competitor, provided it incurs the audit cost. The incumbent insurer can propose a better price to the …rm since audits are unnecessary when the …rm does not change insurer. We …nd the optimal arrangement starting from the sequence of competitive short term contracts and improving on the solution by allowing for o¤ers by the incumbent insurer in each period. The setup is a repeated game where the incumbent insurer o¤ers a contract in each period, taking into account the outside opportunities the …rm can …nd on competitive markets.
We approach the non-binding long term contract in two steps. First, we assume that the schedule of investment is the same as in the previous section. This allows to show that the longsighted sequence of short-term contracts may be improved upon by letting the incumbent insurer o¤er a contract so that the …rm does not want to pay for an audit. We then describe the optimal sequence of investment in prevention.
Transfers
The solution for the optimal non-binding long term insurance relationship is not trivial. Contracts o¤ered in each period depend on the value of the relationship in the future as well as on the amount invested in precaution in the past. Suppose initially that the stream of investments is the one obtained using the sequence of competitive short term contracts (Proposition 2). By allowing the incumbent insurer to o¤er a contract before the …rm decides to enter a round of costly auditing (i.e., make its type public), the sequence of payments is altered. This result is presented as our third proposition.
Proposition 3 Assuming the sequence of investments is the same as for a long-sighted …rm facing short term contracts, the solution to the repeated insurance relationship is such that insurance is provided in every period by the same insurer. Transfers are then:
-p t = x t + ¦(X t )L + (1 ¡ ±)a for all 0 < t < T .
-and p T = ¦(X T )L + a.
In the proof of Proposition 3 we show that the outcome of the sequence of short term contracts presented in section 4 can be recursively improved. This result obtains by the observation that, for a given schedule of investments, an insurer can make periodic positive pro…ts and still o¤er the same lifetime utility to the …rm. Keeping the same insurer all along allows the …rm to economize on audits since the incumbent in period t ¡ 1 knows the amount of precaution at the beginning of period t. Given that the amount saved by the …rm on an audit is a, the insurer makes a positive pro…t each period by o¤ering a contract that is in every point the same as the one the …rm would obtain after an audit has been performed.
Since the insurance market is competitive, every insurer in period t is willing to give the …rm a rebate (of ±a) to receive the contract and secure a rent (of a) the next period. In the …rst period, an initial audit has to be conducted before the …rm chooses an insurer so that the initial insurer cannot receive rent a. Since the insurer is certain to keep the contract until period T , however, he is willing to o¤er a rebate in period 0 equal to the discounted value of the future pro…ts he will be able to receive as the informed insurer. It follows that the initial period's insurer makes a zero net expected pro…t over its entire relationship. 11 Hence for the same sequence of investments, transfers are equal to those when contracts are short-term, with the addition of a loading (1 ¡ ±) a. All that is left to …nd now is the optimal sequence of investment. We have shown what the sequence of premia looks like for a given sequence of investment. We must now show that this sequence of investment may not be the one that obtains in the optimal relationship where the same insurer can keep the contract forever.
Investments
Since the …rm can change insurer each period, investment is delayed. We have already established that it is not possible for an insurer to dissociate the investment in precaution from its payment by the …rm. Optimally, the insurer would invest everything in period 0 and o¤er …nancing to the …rm through future insurance premia. However, this is impossible since we know that, once the invest- 1 1 To see why, note that if insurers are willing to give the …rm a rebate of ±a every period to secure a rent of a the next period, we have that for every period from t = 0 to t = T ¡ 1, a rebate of ±a is o¤ered. At the same time rent a is pocketed by the insurer every period from t = 1 to t = T . Given discount rate ±, we see that at t = 0 the discounted payo¤ to the insurer is
which is clearly equal to zero. ment is performed, any investor can propose another contract with the pro…le p t described above, that is accepted by the …rm and leaves the …rst insurer uncompensated for its initial investment.
There is, then, delay in the investment in prevention.
However, the path of investments may not be the one observed when the …rm changes insurer in each period. Depending on the size of income e¤ects, the sequence of investment can be di¤erent when the …rm keeps the same insurer and then economize on audit costs compared to what obtains when the …rm recontracts each period on the market. Indeed, the optimal smoothing rule is still given by
;
Since the …rm does not have to pay
for an audit in every period, earnings are higher than in the sequence of competitive short-term contracts. Depending on the function V , the ratio
V 0 (dt) may be a¤ected by the level of earnings d t and d t+1 . This income e¤ect changes the way investment is delayed from period to period. 12 The sequence x 0 ; x 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; x T that satis…es the smoothing condition may not be the one we obtained in the previous section. However, it is still such that there is a ¹ t > 1 such that x t = 0 for all t¸¹ t. The possibility for the …rm to renegotiate in each period makes the insurance relationship look much like as in a short term competitive environment. Because the …rm has the possibility to renegotiate with other insurers, premia p t cannot be used to spread the cost of investment through periods. The premium has to include the payment for the investment made in the period. Since the …rm needs to smooth its earnings through time, the investment has to be delayed. The probability of accident is then decreased slowly in time while it could be made optimal in the …rst period if the …rm could commit in a long term relationship with the insurer.
6 Other Issues
Perfect Memory
Robustness in these results should be tested for a change in the information setting. We supposed here that only the insurer operating the precaution technology in one period knows the level of risk in the beginning of the next period. This is a sensible assumption since outsiders may not be able to observe changes inside the …rm. We also implicitly assumed that an insurer forgets this information as soon as he no longer insures the …rm, and that all the market participants forget the outcome of the public audit after one period. Relaxing this hypothesis and supposing perfect memory instead does not a¤ect the results: Investment is delayed and suboptimal, and follows the same sequence as shown in Proposition 3.
The reasoning is as follows. We know that the …rm incurs the audit cost in the initial period so as to be able to obtain insurance initially. The initial insurer then invests some amount x 0 in prevention technology, an amount that is not known to outsiders. This means that outsiders,
although they recall what was the …rm's risk initially, do not know the …rm's risk at the beginning of period 1. Suppose that a second round of investment is needed. If the …rm wants to change insurer, it will need to incur the audit cost a. The incumbent insurer, knowing that the …rm can incur the audit cost to signal its new risk characteristics, can make the audit unpro…table by o¤ering the …rm a rebate for not incurring the cost. And given that further investment is needed, the …rm would have to incur the audit cost a third time to signal to the market its new risk characteristics after the two …rst rounds of investment.
Suppose on the other hand that no more investment is necessary. The …rm then knows if it were to incur the audit cost that it would always pay a premium equal to the expected loss thereafter since every insurer would know, and recall, that the risk characteristics of the …rm are such that no investment in prevention is warranted anymore. This means that the …rm's sequence of payments
On the other hand, if the incumbent insurer keeps the same contract structure as that of Proposition 3, the …rm's sequence
To remain with the incumbent insurer, it then has to be that the second sequence of payments is less expensive than the …rst. Given the discount rate of ±, it is easy to show that the present values of the two sequences are equal. By concavity of the utility function, it follows that the …rm prefers the second sequence of payments for any discount rate between zero and one. Hence, relaxing the assumption on imperfect memory does not change the results stated in Proposition 3.
Depreciation
Our prevention technology is such that any investment made in period t is fully in place in period t+n. In other words, the prevention technology does not depreciate nor become obsolete. This may be a strong assumption; investments made twenty years ago in prevention technology can hardly be perceived as pertinent today. Introducing a depreciation rate on the prevention technology, however, would not alter our results. Suppose that prevention capital depreciates at rate (1 ¡°), so that at the beginning of period t, the level of prevention technology is°X t¡1 . With depreciation of capital, one unit of capital today is no longer worth one unit tomorrow, but rather°. This means that the marginal bene…t of investing in one unit of prevention is reduced. The way it is reduced is only through a change in the discount rate: The discount rate is no longer ±, but rather°± . The rest of the analysis is the same.
Financial Markets
Our paper assumes that …nancial markets are imperfect in the sense that the …rm cannot …nance its investment in prevention using a standard debt contract. Obviously, if the …rm can have access to …nancial markets and borrow funds through a standard debt contract, the delay of precaution is not an issue anymore. If debt contracts are available, the …rm could borrow the necessary amount to invest in an optimal level of prevention in period 0 and smooth its cost over the entire horizon.
The insurer then only needs to o¤er technical expertise as to the prevention technology and o¤er full insurance at a fair price. This supposes, however, that long term debt contracts are available.
If that is the case, where would be the loss in generality in saying that the initial insurer (i.e., the insurer who obtains the insurance contract in period zero after the …rst audit) purchases the entire debt of the …rm, and then makes the optimal investment? It would not matter for the insurer that the …rm changes insurers after period zero since it receives interest payments for the investment in prevention over the entire life of the …rm. For our model, assuming that long-term insurance contracts are not possible is the same as assuming that standard debt contracts are not possible.
Predatory Pricing
One …nal issue that may warrant some discussion is the fact that the audit cost is assumed by the insured …rm. We could imagine instead that the audit (which costs a) is paid by an outside insurer who wants to enter the bidding war for the insured's contract. Suppose the sequence of investment is the same as the one presented in section 4 and in Proposition 3. Suppose the incumbent insurer charges loading a + " T in the last period. An outsider could then o¤er the …rm to conduct an audit (which costs the outsider a) in exchange for which the …rm signs a contract with the outsider that stipulates a premium load equal to a + " T 2 . Clearly the …rm is better o¤ signing a contract with the outsider since it pays a lower total premium while receiving the same bene…t.
To counter the behavior of the outsider, the incumbent insurer cannot charge a loading that is greater than the cost for an outsider to conduct an audit (i.e., a). The incumbent is therefore guaranteed to receive a pro…t equal to the outsider's audit cost (a) in the last period of the game.
In period T ¡ 1, an outsider knows if he were to invest in an audit that he would be able to extract a rent of a in period T . This rent is valued at ±a in period T ¡ 1. The outsider is then willing to invest in an audit if and only if ¡a + " T ¡1 + ±a¸0, where " T ¡1 is the premium loading that can be charged in period T ¡ 1. The outsider will not invest in an audit in period
This means that the incumbent insurer cannot charge a loading greater than (1 ¡ ±) a in period T ¡ 1 to be certain to keep the contract and pocket pro…t a in period T .
In period T ¡ 2, an outsider would be willing to invest in an audit because he knows that if he gets the contract he would be able to pocket pro…t (1 ¡ ±) a in period T ¡ 1 and pro…t a in period T . In period T ¡ 2 these future pro…ts are worth ± (1 ¡ ±) a + ± 2 a = ±a. An investment in an audit in period T ¡ 2 is then pro…table if and only if ¡a + " T ¡2 + ±a¸0. This means that the incumbent insurer is still able to charge a premium load equal to (1 ¡ ±) a in period T ¡ 2 and still be able to keep the contract for the next two periods while pocketing pro…ts of (1 ¡ ±) a in period T ¡ 1 and a in period T .
Applying the reasoning recursively, we …nd exactly the same sequence of transfers as in Proposition 3. There is therefore no loss in generality in assuming that the …rm pays for the audit instead of an outside insurer.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown when …rms do not have access to long term contracts that investment in prevention technology not only is delayed, but also less than the social optimum. This is true whether we force …rms to recontract every period (after they pay for a costly audit), or whether we let the …rm choose to renegotiate at any point in time or not. This investment path does not have any incidence on the amount of insurance purchased in each period as the …rm is always fully insured. This does not mean, however, that the …rm is able to perfectly smooth its income across time. Given that only short term contracts are available, …rms end up paying each period for that period's marginal investment in prevention. This is in contrast with the full commitment case where the socially optimal level of investment is done in the initial period, and where the …rm pays for this investment over its entire life, thus perfectly smoothing its income over time.
This result obtains for a given sequence of investments. As shown in section 3 of the paper, it is clear that an insurer who knows that it can hold the contract on the entire horizon will want to invest an amount X ¤¤ in the …rst period. The implementability of this policy depends on the enforceability of long-term relationships with the …rm. If the …rm can renegotiate with competitive insurers when the investment has been paid by the initial insurer, then the initial insurer will not invest X ¤¤ in the …rst period; instead the initial insurer will delay investment until some amount
The model we developed herein applies to the case of environmental hazard/insurance where the government sets the penalty/clean up fee of environmental damages to L. This loss which the …rm must bear in case of an accident is catastrophic in the sense that the …rm is better o¤ insuring it than remaining in autarky. We did not address how the size of the penalty is chosen by the government. We can only presume (or hope?) that the government sets the penalty e¢ciently to cover all social costs related to environmental damages.
Another direct application is to the amount of prevention o¤ered to patients by medical providers.
If patients are able to switch from one health insurer to another, we would possibly observe a delay in the amount of preventive medicine o¤ered by health providers. This then raises the question of whether the US health system, where individuals may not always have the same health insurer over their lifetime, produces socially ine¢cient health prevention incentives. On the other hand, a health system like in Canada, France and Germany provides e¢cient long term incentive to invest a socially optimal amount in prevention.
An aspect of the problem we did not touch is the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the …rm in maintaining the prevention technology at its optimal level. Because the …rm is insured and because the …rm may be the only one to know whether regular maintenance is done, the insurer may no longer be willing to invest as much in prevention technology as before. This may delay investment in prevention even more.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We show here that x 0 = X ¤¤ and x t = 0 for all t¸1. Using the system of …rst order equations (3)- (5) we apply the following recursive proof.
² Suppose¸T = 0. Then, by (4) 1 + ¦ 0 (X T )L = 0 and X T¸Xt¡1 , that is,
. This is a contradiction.
Hence,¸T > 0 and
Conditions (5) on investment imply:
But this is a contradiction since¸t = 0 implies that
² Since¸t +1 > 0 implies¸t > 0 for all t and since¸T > 0,¸t > 0 for all t > 0 at the solution.
This means that no investment is performed after period 0, so that X t = X 0 .
+¸T , we can recursively compute the multipliers¸t to …nd:
with the preceding formula, this can be rewritten as
Note that X ¤¤ is the level of precaution that minimizes the cost of investment plus the expected discounted value of potential losses.
Proof of Claim 1. Condition (6) and usual regularity conditions on the function V imply that p n t = p l t = p t . In each given period, the …rm gets the same revenue in both states of nature, which means it is fully insured. The per period insurer's participation constraints impose p t =
Proof of Claim 2. Let us write the …rm's value for any given sequence of investments X = (X 0 ; X 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; X T ).
Then, a change in the …rst period investment X 0 that leaves the other periods' levels of precaution unchanged entails a change in intertemporal value equal to
:
dV(X)=dX 0¸0 , and the …rm's value could be increased with X 0¸X ¤ .
Proof of Claim 3. The irreversibility constraint is always binding in the last period:¸T > 0 so that X T = X T¡1 . This is easy to show since if¸T = 0, then X T¸XT¡1 and 1 + ¦ 0 (X T )L = 0. Buţ T = 0 in condition (7) for t = T ¡1 implies that (1 + ¦ 0 (X T¡1 )L) ¹ T¡1 = ¹ T +¸T ¡1 > 0 and, hence, that X T¡1 > X T , which is a contradiction. In the last period, the …rm would always like to disinvest if this was possible. Hence, Claim 1 implies that the premium is
Proof of Claim 4. For this claim, we need to show the following corollary to claim 3.
Corollary 1
In the problem of the long-sighted …rm and the sequence of short term competitive contracts, the Lagrange multipliers for irreversibility constraints writȩ
Proof of Corollary 1. Claim 3 implies that
The condition for investment (7) in the preceding period writeş
and theņ
so that computing each¸t recursively we obtain:
which completes the proof of the corollary.
Suppose the investment is done in the …rst period only, such that x 0 = X 0 > 0 and x t = 0 for t¸1. Then, X t = X 0 for all t > 0 and the …rm's revenue is the same in each of these periods since the competitive insurers set the premia equal to p t = ¦(X 0 )L for all t > 0. Since we then have
for all t > 0, Corollary 1 gives:
The optimal condition for period 0 investment is:
This can be rewritten as
The full commitment level of investment would be such that the last term is equal to 0:
which is impossible since the investment X 0 has to be paid for by the …rm in period 0. Hence,
that there is underinvestment in precaution if everything has to be invested in the …rst period.
Proof of Claim 5. This proof is made recursively.
² We know there is no investment in period T .
² Let us suppose there is no investment in T¡1 neither and measure the welfare e¤ect of a small increase of investment in period T ¡1. If there is no investment in T ¡1 the …rm's dividend is the same in the last two periods:
The discounted value of the …rm for the last two periods writes:
A small positive dx T¡1 then entails a change dV T ¡1 (X t¡2 ) in the …rm's welfare:
² Let us suppose there is no investment in periods t through T , the …rm's revenue then being the same d t = d T in all these periods. A small increase of investment in period t has a positive impact on the …rm's utility, dV t (X t¡1 ) > 0, if
Note that if 1 +
for all ¿ = 1 ¢ ¢ ¢ T ¡ t. Hence, if the condition for no investment (given there is no investment in t + 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ T ) holds in t, it holds in all subsequent periods (given there is no investment after these periods). Since there is no investment in T , the condition is valid in T ¡1 and then in any preceding period and the result holds.
Proof of Claim 6. From Claim 5, if no investment is made at datet, then no investment is ever performed aftert. Since there is always a positive investment in t = 0,t > 0. Since there is no investment performed in t = T , the …rst period with no investment made is any period t > 0.
Periodt is such that the condition for no investment established in the preceding Claim is veri…ed int and not int ¡ 1:
DenoteX the minimum precaution level such that no investment is performed int. From Claim 2 it has to be thatX¸X 0 > X ¤ . This level is such that 1 +
Proof of Claim 7. First order conditions for our problem write
For t <t a positive investment is made each period so that X t > X t¡1 and¸t = 0. We then have
This ratio increases in time since ¦ 0 (:) is increasing and X t increases in time.
For t >t,¸t > 0: no investment is made in those periods so
, which completes the proofs of the seven claims.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us still denotet as the cut-o¤ period after which no investment is performed when there are no long term contracts.X = Xt is the amount invested in protection up until timet. With a sequence of short term contracts, ¦ ³X´i s the probability of accident for the remaining T ¡t periods. Let A t represent the incumbent insurer at the start of period t.
² At the beginning of period T , insurer A T (that had the contract in T ¡1) knows the …rm's level of risk. By accepting the incumbent insurer's contract for period T , the …rm saves the audit cost. Everything else being equal, the incumbent insurer can charge a above the fair premium, that is, p T = ¦ ³X´L + a and still maintain his relationship with the …rm. The …rm is indi¤erent between this contract and the one it could obtain on the competitive market after an audit.
² The insurer who obtains the contract in period T ¡1 will be able to retain the contract in period T , and thus secure a payo¤ of a in the end period. The market equilibrium premium, p T¡1 , 13 in T ¡1 is then such thatp We then havept = ¦(X)L ¡ ±a; which yields utility Vt to the …rm equal to
² Insurer At will take advantage of his private information to propose a premium pt that gives the …rm this exact expected utility. We thus have to …nd the pt that solves
This is obtained with pt = a ¡ ±a + ¦ ³X´L .
Insurer At can continue its relationship with the …rm for every period from then on. The total discounted payo¤ to the incumbent insurer who remains in this relationship from period t onward is given by
² In periodt¡1 an investment xt ¡1 is made for which the …rm has to pay. The insurer in period t¡1 would optimally invest xt ¡1 but spread the cost over the following periods. This would increase the …rm's utility and allow the insurer to charge a higher premium in each period thereafter. However, insurer At cannot spread the cost of investment xt ¡1 on the following periods since competitors would then still o¤er the pro…le p t fromt on and obtain the contract.
The investment xt ¡1 then has to be paid by the …rm in periodt ¡ 1.
The competitive premium would then be such that
which gives the …rm the utility
² The incumbent insurer At ¡1 can make sure he keeps the contract int ¡ 1 if he performs the investment xt ¡1 and charges a transfer pt ¡1 such that
That is
² Applying this reasoning recursively from t =t¡1 to t = 1 with investment x t in each of those periods, we …nd that the payment in period t <t must be p t = ¦ (X t ) L + x t + a ¡ ±a;
and the discounted payo¤ for the insurer getting the contract in t is a ¡ ±a + ±(a ¡ ±a) + ¢ ¢ ¢ + ± T ¡t¡1 (a ¡ ±a) + ± T ¡t a = a ² In period 0, an audit must be conducted since there is no incumbent insurer with the information on the …rm's risk. Insurer, then, cannot charge a and demand no audit. Since the insurer that receives the contract in t = 0 can remain in relation with the …rm until t = T and secure a payo¤ valued ±a in period 0, competition pushes all investors to propose a rebate of ±a in period 0. The transfer in t = 0 is then
and the discounted total payo¤ from the contract for the insurer is 0.
